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Abstract
Building upon the standard model of monopolistic competition on the
market for intermediary goods, we propose a simple dynamical model of
the formation of production networks. The model subsumes the standard
general equilibrium approach and robustly reproduces key stylized facts
of firms’ demographics. Firms’ growth rates are negatively correlated
with size and follow a core double-exponential distribution followed by
fat tails. Firms’ size and production network are power-law distributed.
These properties emerge because continuous inflow of new firms shifts
away the model from a steady state to a disequilibrium regime in which
firms get scaled according to their resistance to competitive forces.
1 Introduction
The scale-free nature of a wide range of socio-economic networks has been ex-
tensively documented in the recent literature [see e.g Baraba´si et al., 2009,
Gabaix, 2009, Schweitzer et al., 2009]. An example of central concern for macro-
economics are production networks whose scale-free nature has recently been
put forward by Acemoglu et al. [2012] as a potentially major driver of macro-
economic fluctuations [see also Battiston et al., 2007]. Relatedly, the scale-free
distribution of firms’ size [see Axtell, 2001] has also been identified as a key
micro-economic source of aggregate volatility [see Gabaix, 2011].
It therefore seems problematic that the central tenet of economic theory with
respect to the formation of structures, namely general equilibrium theory, has
essentially nothing to say about the scale-free nature, or the nature in general,
of the distribution of firms’ size or this of production networks. Indeed, in a
general equilibrium framework firms’ size are either indeterminate (when there
are constant returns to scale) or completely determinate by the primitives of
‡CentraleSupe´lec, stanislao.gualdi@gmail.com
§Paris School of Economics, Universite´ Paris I Panthe´on-Sorbonne,antoine.mandel@univ-
pais1.fr
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the model (when there are decreasing returns to scale, the equilibrium size of
the firm is completely determinate by its production technique.) In particular
when firms have the same production technique, they have the same size at
equilibrium.
The present paper addresses this wide gap in the theory through a dynamic
extension of the general equilibrium model that accounts for three key stylized
facts about the structure of the productive sector: firms’ growth rates follow
a Laplace distribution [see e.g Bottazzi and Secchi, 2006], firms’ sizes are Zipf
distributed and the degree distribution of production networks are scale-free.
The backbone of our approach is a model of monopolistic competition on
the markets for intermediate goods, akin to the one introduced by Ethier [1982]
(on the basis of Dixit and Stiglitz [1977]) and popularized by the endogenous
growth literature [see e.g Romer, 1990]. In this framework, we represent supply
relationships as the weighted edges of a network and consider out-of-equilibrium
dynamics in which (i) demands are made in nominal terms and sellers adjust
their prices to balance real supply and nominal demand (ii) firms progressively
adjust their production technologies (i.e the network weights) to prevailing mar-
ket prices. When the set of relationships is fixed (i.e only the weights of the
network can evolve), the identification with the underlying general equilibrium
model is perfect in the sense that (i) the adjacency matrix of the network is
in a one to one correspondence with the underlying ge economy (ii) the model
does converge to the underlying general equilibrium. However, the context of
interest for us is this where the technological structure is not fixed a priori and
where, the different production goods being assumed substitutable, firms can, in
the long-run, adjust their production technologies/ supply relationships (i.e the
adjacency matrix) as a function of market prices. Then, we show that the model
does not in general admit a steady-state but rather settles in a non-equilibrium
regime where the distribution of firms ’size and the structure of the production
network are scale-free [see Bak et al., 1987, for related results].
Our approach offers a much more systemic perspective on firms’ demograph-
ics that this existing in the literature. Indeed, from Kalecki [1945] and Simon
et al. [1977] to more recent contributions such as Bottazzi and Secchi [2006],
the problem of the distribution of firms’ size has been approached almost solely
through “island-models” in which the growth of each firm is studied in isola-
tion and driven by exogenous shocks. On the contrary, in our model, growth
opportunities are endogenous and we account for general equilibrium linkages.
More broadly, our paper contributes to the literature on the formation
of socio-economic networks [see e.g Jackson et al., 2008] by providing micro-
foundations for the emergence of scale-free networks which have been largely
lacking in this literature, but for the notable exception of Jackson and Rogers
[2007]. The paper also has close relationships with the infra marginal analy-
sis pioneered by Xiaokai Yang [see Yang and Borland, 1991, Cheng and Yang,
2004] and Bak and co-authors’s approach to the importance of self-organized
criticality in economic networks [see Bak et al., 1993, Scheinkman and Wood-
ford, 1994].
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we propose
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a model of production networks as monopolistically competitive markets for
intermediate goods. In section 3, we propose a numerical exploration of the
dynamics of the model. Section 4 gives an analytical proof of the main results
and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 A general equilibrium primer
We consider an economy consisting in a finite set of (monopolistically compet-
itive) firms producing differentiated goods and of a representative household.
We denote the set of firms by M = {1, · · · ,m}, the representative household by
the index 0 and the set of agents by N = {0, · · · ,m}.
Our central concern is the endogenous formation of supply relationships
between firms. Therefore, to assume away any exogenous determinism, we place
ourselves in a setting where there is no a priori distinction between potential
intermediary goods. More precisely, we consider that the production possibilities
of firm i are given by a C.E.S production function of the form:
fi(x0, (xj)j=1,··· ,ni) = x
α
0 (
ni∑
j=1
xσj )
(1−α)/σ (1)
where x0 is the quantity of labor used, ni the number of intermediary goods/
components combined and xj the quantity of input j used in the production
process.
This representation assumes that each good can be used interchangeably in
the production process (as the production function depends only on the number
of inputs). It is standard in models of monopolistic competition on the interme-
diate goods markets [see Ethier, 1982, Romer, 1990]. One of its key implications
is that productivity grows with the number of components/suppliers1.
As for the representative household, we consider that he supplies a con-
stant quantity of labor (normalized to 1) and has preferences represented by a
Cobb-Douglas utility function of the form u(x1, · · · , xm) =
∏m
i=1 x
α0,i
i . He hence
spends his income on each good i ∈ M proportionally to α0,i (we assume that
for all i ∈ M,α0,i > 0, so that the household consumes a positive quantity of
each and every good).
As such, this model is incomplete. The micro-economic choices of the agents
in terms of production or consumption can not be determined without further
assumptions on the structure of interactions. In our firm-focused setting, these
interactions are mainly characterized by the production network, which specifies
the flows of goods between firms. The formation of this production network is
the key focus of the reminder of this paper.
1This feature is also at the core of the infra-marginal approach to economic growth [see
Yang and Borland, 1991] and of Adam Smith’s original description of the effects of the division
of labor.
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A general equilibrium approach to the issue would consist, in our setting, in
defining the production network through an adjacency matrix A = (ai,j)i,j∈M
such that ai,j = 1 if j is a supplier of i and ai,j = 0 otherwise. Consistency
with equation (1) would then require that for all i ∈ M, ∑mj=1 ai,j = ni and,
denoting by Si(A) := {j ∈ M | ai,j = 1} the set of suppliers of firm i, the
production function of firm i would be further specialized into:
fi(x0, (xj)j∈Si) = x
α
0 (
∑
j∈Si(A)
xσj )
(1−α)/σ (2)
One could then define a general equilibrium of the economy E(A) associated
to the production network A as follows.
Definition 1 A general equilibrium of the economy E(A) is a collection of prices
(p∗1, · · · , p∗m) ∈ RN+ , production levels (q∗1 , · · · , q∗m) ∈ RM+ and commodity flows
(x∗i,j)i,j=0···n ∈ RM×M+ such that:
1. Markets clear. That is one has for all j ∈ N, q∗j =
∑n
i=0 x
∗
i,j (with q
∗
0 = 1
by normalization).
2. The representative consumer maximizes his utility. That is (q∗0 , (x
∗
0,j)j=1,··· ,n)
is a solution to 
max ui((x0,j)j=1,··· ,n)
s.t
∑n
j=1 p
∗
jx
∗
0,j ≤ 1
(with the price of labor normalized to 1)
3. Firms maximize profits. That is for all i ∈ M, (q∗i , (x∗i,j)j∈Si(A)) is a
solution to 
max p∗i qi −
∑
j∈Si(A) p
∗
jxi,j
s.t fi((xi,j)j∈Si(A)) ≥ qi
Hence, in a general equilibrium setting, the adjacency structure of the pro-
duction network is fixed and the magnitude of the physical flows between firms
is determined at equilibrium. A particular case that has received widespread
attention in the literature [see Acemoglu et al., 2012, Long and Plosser, 1983]
is the Cobb-Douglas case (i.e when σ → 0) in which the value of flows between
firms at equilibrium is given by the corresponding exponents in the production
function (uniformly equal to one in our framework).
Our aim in the following is to subsume this general equilibrium approach
within an endogenous model of the formation of production networks.
2.2 An endogenous model of network formation
We consider a coupled model of network formation and out of equilibrium dy-
namics in which firms adaptively search for profit maximizing/cost minimizing
4
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.60
input combinations. More precisely, we consider that time is discrete and in-
dexed by t ∈ N. Each agent i ∈ N is initially endowed with a wealth w0i ∈ R+
and a quantity of output q0i ∈ R+ (normalized to 1 throughout in the case of
the representative household). As for the production network, we assume its
initial structure is given by the matrix of weights A0 = (α0i,j)i,j∈N , where αi,j
represents the share of agent i’s expenses directed towards agent j.
We are concerned with the time evolution of the wealths (wti)
t∈N
i∈N , the quan-
tities produced (qti)
t∈N
i∈N , the production network At = (α0i,j)
t∈N
i,j∈N , as well as this
of prices (pti)
t∈N
i∈N . This evolution is driven by the interplay between the workings
of the market out of equilibrium and the evolution of the production network.
More precisely, during each period t ∈ N, the following sequence of events takes
place:
1. Each agent i receives the nominal demand
∑
j∈N αi,jw
t
j .
2. Given the nominal demand
∑
j∈N αi,jw
t
j and the output stock q
t
i , the
market clearing price for firm i would be
pti =
∑
j∈N αi,jw
t
j
qti
. (3)
Now, we shall assume that prices adjust frictionally to their market-
clearing values and hence consider that firm actually set their prices ac-
cording to
pti = τpp
t
i + (1− τp)pt−1i (4)
where τp ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter measuring the speed of price adjustment
(the case τp = 1 corresponding to instantaneous price adjustment).
3. Whenever τp < 1 markets do not clear (except if the system is at a sta-
tionary equilibrium). In case of excess demand, we assume that clients
are rationed proportionally to their demand. In case of excess supply, we
assume that the amount qti :=
∑
j∈N αi,jw
t
j/pti is actually sold and that the
rest of the output is stored as inventory. Together with production occur-
ring on the basis of purchased inputs, this yields the following evolution
of the product stock:
qt+1i = q
t
i − qti + fi(
α0,iw
t
i
pt0
, (
αj,iw
t
i
ptj
)j∈Si(A)) (5)
Note that in the case where τp = 1, one necessarily has q
t
i = q
t
i and
equation (5) reduces to
qt+1i = fi(
α0,iw
t
i
pt0
, (
αj,iw
t
i
ptj
)j∈Si(A[t)) (6)
5
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4. As for the evolution of agents’ wealth, it is determined on the one hand by
their purchases of inputs and their sales of output. On the other hand, we
assume that the firm sets its expenses for next period at (1− λ) times its
current revenues and distributes the rest as dividends to the representative
household. That is one has:
∀i ∈M, wt+1i = (1− λ)qtipti (7)
wt+10 = q
t
0p
t
0 + λ
∑
i∈M
qtip
t
i (8)
Note that equation (8) can be interpreted as assuming that firms have my-
opic expectations about their nominal demand (i.e they assume they will
face the same nominal demand next period) and target a fixed profit/dividend
share λ ∈ (0, 1).
This first sequence of operations defines out of equilibrium dynamics for a given
production network. As for the evolution of the network, it takes place at the
end of the period according to two process: one governs the evolution of weights,
the other the evolution of the adjacency structure.
5. As for the evolution of weights, given prevailing prices the optimal input
weights for a firm i are those that minimize production costs. These are
defined as the solution to the following optimization problem: max fi(
α0, i
pt0
, (
αj , i
ptj
)j∈Si(A))
s.t
∑
j∈Si(A) αj,i = 1
(9)
Now, as in the case of prices, we shall consider that the process of techno-
logical adjustment can be subject to frictions and that input weights are
actually updated according to the following rule:
αt+1i = τwα
t
i + (1− τw)αti (10)
where αti ∈ RM denotes the solution of 9 and τw ∈ [0, 1] measures the
speed of technological adjustment of the production network.
6. As for the evolution of the adjacency structure, each firm independently
receives the opportunity to change one of its suppliers with probability
ρchg ∈ [0, 1]. If the opportunity actually arises for firm i in period t, it
selects randomly one of its suppliers ji and another random firm j among
those to which it is not already connected. It then shifts its connection
from firm ji to firm j if and only if the price of j is cheaper than this of
ji. In other words, the adjacency matrix A
t evolves according to:
at+1
i,ji
=
{
1 if pi,ji ≤ pi,j
0 otherwise
at+1i,j = 1− at+1i,ji
(11)
6
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The actual weight of the new connection is then determined according to
an average of these of other suppliers.
7. Finally, the possibility for a firm to lose connections implies that it can
eventually be driven out of the market. Indeed, we consider that a firm
that has lost all its connections toward other firms exits the market. To
sustain competition in the economy, we assume that those exits are com-
pensated by entries of new firms according to the following process. Every
period, each (potential) firm that is out of the market independently en-
ters with probability pnew. When entering, the firm is endowed with the
following characteristics:
• The number of suppliers is drawn from a binomial distributionB(p, n).
The success probability p is adjusted in order to preserve the mean
degree in the network in the long-run.
• The price is initially set equal to the average price in the economy.
• Each firm in the economy rewires to the newly created firm indepen-
dently with probability k¯/n, where k¯ is the average number of clients
at time 0.
• The wealth of the firm is set equal to the average wealth of other
firms2 and its initial output stock is empty.
2.3 The linear case
In order to gain an understanding of the basic dynamics of the model, let us
first consider the case where the network is fixed, both in terms of weights and
adjacency structure. Note that this fixed weights assumption is equivalent to
the assumption used in Acemoglu et al. [2012] that production functions are
Cobb-Douglas (with the corresponding weights). In this respect, this simplified
version of our model can be seen as an out of equilibrium extension of Acemoglu
et al. [2012].
The dynamic properties of this model are relatively straightforward. First,
it is clear that the evolution of wealths follows a linear dynamic, which can be
written matricially as:
wt+1 = R(λ)Awt (12)
where
R(λ) :=

λ · · · · · · λ
0
... (1− λ)I
0

accounts for the redistribution of firms’ revenues. The matrix of weights A being
moreover row-stochastic, it is straightforward to check using Perron-Froebenius
2To ensure conservation of money in the long term, this initial wealth of the firm is in
practice considered as a loan that the firm has to reimburse before it can pay any dividend
7
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.60
theorem that the linear system in 12 is globally asymptotically stable. Accord-
ingly, as illustrated in Fig. 1, we observe convergence in our simulations towards
a stationary equilibrium determined by w ∈ RN such that:
w = R(λ)Aw (13)
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time
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-2
0
2
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tio
n 
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)
0 1000 2000
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10
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Figure 1: One time-step inflation rate and total production as a function of
time for the basic model (ρchg = 0) and different values of τp, τw: τp = 1 and
τw = 0 (yellow), τp = 0.9 and τw = 0 (red), τp = 0.9 and τw = 0.9 (blue). Other
parameters are: σ = 0.5, λ = 0.05, M = 1000.
2.4 Frictions and general equilibrium
Proceeding stepwise, we now consider the case where the adjacency structure
of the network is fixed but the weights evolve according to equation (10). This
setting is akin to the general equilibrium one introduced in section 2.1 but for the
fact that firms aim at enforcing a mark-up proportional to λ on their production
costs rather than at maximizing profits. More precisely, steady states of the
dynamical system defined by equations (4) to (10) are mark-up equilibria in the
following sense:
Definition 2 A mark-up equilibrium of the economy E(A) is a collection of
prices (p∗0, · · · , p∗n) ∈ RM+ , production levels (q∗0 , · · · , q∗n) ∈ RM+ and commodity
flows (x∗i,j)i,j=0···n ∈ RM×M+ such that:
• Markets clear. That is for all i ∈M, one has
q∗i =
M∑
j=1
x∗i,j .
• The representative consumer maximizes his utility. That is (q∗0 , (x∗0,j)j=1,··· ,n)
is a solution to 
max ui((x0,j)j=1,··· ,n)
s.t
∑n
j=1 p
∗
jx
∗
0,j ≤ 1
8
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(with the price of labor normalized to 1)
• Production costs are minimized. That is for all i ∈ M, (x∗i,j)j=0···n is the
solution to {
min
∑
j∈Si(A) p
∗
jxj
s.t fi(xj) ≥ q∗i
• Prices are set as a mark-up over production costs at rate λ
1− λ. That is
one has for all i ∈ N :
p∗i = (1 +
λ
1− λ )
∑
j∈Si(A) p
∗
jx
∗
i,j
q∗i
Note that for λ = 0, mark-up equilibria coincide with general equilibria in
the sense of Definition 1. Indeed in a setting with constant returns to scale,
profits are zero at a general equilibrium3.
In this sense our model can be seen as a (dynamic) extension of the conven-
tional general equilibrium approach. Yet, this identification between economic
equilibria and steady states of our dynamical system only makes sense if these
steady states are stable. We investigate the issue numerically by performing,
for different values of the elasticity of substitution σ, Monte-Carlo simulations
in which we let vary the speeds of price and technology adjustment, i.e τp and
τw.
The results of these simulations are reported in Figure 2 as phase diagrams
in the (τp, τw) plane. As long as σ is in a neighborhood of 1, the system exhibits
three distinct phases.
• There is first a stable phase in which the system converges to equilibrium:
excess demand vanishes and prices converge to their equilibrium values
(see Figure 3).
• As the speed of price and technological adjustment increase, the system
reaches an “excess demand” phase with rationing. There is persistent
mismatch between supply and demand, positive inflation and sustained
volatility in the network (see Figure 3 as well). Note that disequilibrium
appears to materialize via inflation and excess demand rather than via
deflation and excess supply. This is however an aggregate view which av-
erages excess demand and excess supply, increasing and decreasing prices.
Yet, there is a bias towards inflation and excess demand because the price
adjustment process (equation 4) induces an asymmetry in the magnitude
of the price adjustments upwards and downwards.
• Last, for slow values of the price adjustment process, the system reaches
a phase of “cyclical volatility”. As illustrated in Figure 3, the system
3Yet in a dynamic setting like ours assuming λ > 0 seems necessary to prevent firms from
remaining permanently at the brink of bankruptcy.
9
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then oscillates between inflation and deflation, excess demand and excess
supply, positive and negative profits. In this phase, as the prices evolve too
slowly, output stocks carry the burden of adjustment. This leads to very
strong feedback effects which entail a synchronized state of the economy
(as in Gualdi et al. [2015b] and Gualdi et al. [2015a]). Figure 4 illustrates
the processes at play during a cycle. During a first phase, production
is larger than demand and firms build up stocks while the price adjusts
downwards. During a second phase (after the inflexion of the supply-
demand curve), demand is larger than supply, the stocks get built down
but prices keep adjusting downwards (there is still excess supply in the
stock that the stock of output is non-empty). The price keeps adjusting
downwards until the stocks are completely depleted. At this stage, excess
demand is at a maximum and profits at a minimum because prices are
low and stocks are empty. Yet,in absence of buffer stocks, prices become
more volatile and increase rapidly until excess demand is absorbed and a
new cycle starts.
Hence, despite its simplicity (there is no evolution of the adjacency struc-
ture of the network at this stage), the model displays a very rich taxonomy of
behavior: general equilibrium, rationing, periodic “overproduction” crisis.
The key determinant of the transition between the stable general equilibrium
phase and the unstable “excess demand” phase is the relative speed of price
(τp) and technological (τw) adjustment. The faster the relative speed of price
adjustment, the more stable the system is. Yet, the stability range increases
as the absolute speed of price adjustment decreases. Moreover, the size of the
stable region increases both as the elasticity of substitution decreases and as
the firms optimal budget allocation for households increases (i.e. for larger
values of the parameter α in the production function). There exists a critical
value σ∗ (σ∗ ∼ 5/9 for the parameter setting used in figure 2) such that for
σ ≤ σ∗, the unstable region disappears and the system converges to equilibrium
independently of the speeds of price and technological adjustment.
These latter results are reminiscent of those obtained in Bonart et al. [2014]:
the larger the intrinsic volatility of the system (in our setting, the higher the
elasticity of substitution), the slower the adjustment processes shall be for the
system to be stable. As for the formation of networks, these results confirm
that in absence of changes in the adjacency structure, the characteristics of
the production networks are completely determined by exogenous technological
constraints (represented by the production functions in our setting).
10
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Figure 2: Phase diagram of the model with ρchg = 0 for σ = 4/5.
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Figure 3: One time-step inflation rate, average mismatch between supply and
demand, total production and average firms profits as a function of time for the
basic model (ρchg = 0) and three different values of τp, τw corresponding to
different regions of Fig. 2: τp = 0.5 and τw = 0.5 (black lines), τp = 0.9 and
τw = 0.9 (red lines), τp = 0.05 and τw = 0.5 (green lines). Other parameters
are: σ = 4/5, λ = 0.05, M = 2000.
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Figure 4: Average excess supply, inflation and average profit as a function of
time for a cycle observed in Fig. 3 for τp = 0.05 and τw = 0.5. Inflation and
profits are rescaled for illustrative purposes. Other parameters are as in Fig. 3.
3 The endogenous formation of production net-
works
3.1 Steady-state analysis
In this section, we account for the increased flexibility in production technologies
implied by models of monopolistic competition on the market for intermediary
goods a` la Ethier [1982] and Romer [1990]. In other words, we consider that the
adjacency structure evolves according to Equation (11).
A steady state of the system would consist in vectors of wealths w˜, prices p˜,
productions q˜ and in an adjacency matrix A˜ satisfying the following properties.
• First, according to equation 11, each firm i buys only from the cheapest
suppliers (otherwise it would rewire). That is, one has for all i ∈ N :
max
j∈Si
p˜j ≤ min
k 6∈Si
p˜k (14)
• Second, firms only differ in terms of their number of suppliers ni and, at a
steady state, the larger the number of suppliers of a firm, the more produc-
tive and the cheaper it is (otherwise it could adopt the same production
12
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technique than any firm with a smaller number of suppliers and improve
upon it by diversifying marginally). That is one has for all i, j ∈M :
ni > nj ⇒ p˜i > p˜j (15)
• Therefrom, one can deduce that at a steady-state only the firms with the
maximal number of suppliers (the more productive according to equation
15) actually have consumers (according to equation 14). More precisely,
let us denote by V the set of active firms in the steady state (i.e these
actually having consumers), by Mµ := {i ∈ M | ni = µ} the set of
firms with exactly µ suppliers, by mµ the number of such firms, by µ1 ≥
µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µr the decreasing sequence of µs for which Mν 6= ∅ and let
νi =
∑i
j=1mµj . One then has:
Mµi ⊂ V ⇒ card{` ∈M | n` ≥ νi−1} ≥ mµi (16)
That is to say, for a firm with µi suppliers to have at least one consumer,
there must be a firm that requires more than νi−1 suppliers because its
first νi−1 suppliers are these that are more productive and hence cheaper
than the µi suppliers firm.
A corollary of equation 16 is that there exists a steady state only if there
are at least mµr firms that have more than νr−1 suppliers as otherwise there
would always be a firm (in Mr) without consumers. Such a firm would exit
the market and be replaced by an entering firm, hence contradicting the fact
that the system is at a steady state. To clarify this condition, let us consider
the case where all the firms have a distinct number of suppliers (that is r = m
and ∀i mµi = 1). Then, there can be a steady state only if there exists a firm
with exactly m suppliers, i.e a firm connected to every other firm. It is also
worth noting that in this case the production network is a nested-split graph
[see Ko¨nig et al., 2012, 2014] because every consumer of a firm in Mi also is a
consumer of each of the cheaper firms (in Mj such that j < i).
This necessary condition for the existence of a steady-state is clearly ex-
tremely restrictive. It is not observed in simulations unless the system is initial-
ized in a very peculiar state (e.g by letting all the firms exactly have the same
number of suppliers). On the contrary, we generically observe sustained growth
and decline of firms, entry and exit and changes in the micro-structure of the
network. However, the system exhibits very robust distributional stylized facts
that we investigate in the remaining of this paper.
3.2 Distribution of firms’ growth rates
A first major stylized fact of firms’ demographics is that the growth rates of
firms are distributed according to a “tent-shaped” double-exponential distribu-
tion (see Bottazzi and Secchi [2006]). As illustrated in Fig. 5, our model gener-
ates exactly this type of Laplace distributions. For relatively short time intervals
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growth rates are indeed distributed according to ∼ exp a|g − g0| as found in em-
pirical data. Following Arthur [1994], Bottazzi and Secchi put forward the fact
that a Laplace type of distribution emerges because market success is cumulative
or self-reinforcing. In their “island-based” model, this self-reinforcing process
is hard-wired into the model: “we model this idea using a process whereby the
probability for a given firm to obtain new opportunities depends on the number
of opportunities already caught.” In our setting, “self-reinforcing success” is also
at play but it emerges endogenously. Indeed, the price-setting process (see equa-
tion 4) is such that whenever a firm gains a new consumer, its price increases
(directly but also indirectly through the increase demand that it adresses to his
own suppliers) and hence its competitiveness decreases. However, the larger the
firm is the weaker the effect of an additional consumer is on its price and hence
the more competitive it remains. Therefore, larger firms are more competitive
and can seize more frequently new business opportunities. Hence, our model
generates endogenously the self-reinforcing feedbacks introduced exogenously in
Bottazzi and Secchi [2006] to generate a Laplacian distribution.
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Figure 5: Distribution of firms’ growth rates after 2 106 time steps for the model
with ρchg = ρnew = 0.05 and σ = 1/2. Different symbols / colors correspond
to different time intervals to compute growth rates (for each firm we histogram
only the last 30 rates). Other parameters are: τp = τw = 0.8 and M = 10000.
Results are averaged over 20 realizations.
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Figure 6: Left : scatter plot of firms growth rates versus firms (log) sales. Right :
growth rates standard deviation as a function of firms (log) sales. Other pa-
rameters are as in Figures. 7 and ??. We observe a small negative significant
correlation (∼ −0.008) between growth rate and (log) sales.
Figure 6 illustrates two other important stylized facts about firms’ growth
rates that the model captures very clearly [see e.g Coad, 2009]. There is a
negative correlation between growth rate and size. There is also a negative
relationship between growth rate variance and firm size.
3.3 Fat-tails in production networks
On a more structural level, key stylized facts about firms are the Zipf dis-
tribution of size [see Axtell, 2001] and the presence of fat-tails in the degree
distribution of production networks [see Atalay et al., 2011, Acemoglu et al.,
2012]. As illustrated in Fig. 7 both features are clearly matched in the long-run
by our model. Both the distribution of firms’ sizes and the in-degree distri-
bution of the production network are characterized by a power-law tail with
exponent close to 2.1. The power-law nature of the distributions are confirmed
by Kolmogorv-Smirnov tests. More fundamentally, the emergence of these fat
tails is completely independent of (i) the initial distribution of firms’ sizes (ii)
the initial structure of the network and (iii) of the elasticity of substitution σ.
3.4 A master-equation approach to the formation of pro-
duction networks
As noted by Bottazzi and Secchi [2006], the emergence of a scale-free distribution
of firms’ size can not be explained by an exponential distribution of growth-rates.
As a matter of fact, figure 5 shows that as the length of the time intervals used
to compute the growth rates increase, the exponential character vanishes and
fatter tails progressively appear.
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Figure 7: Basic firms statistics after 2 106 time steps for the model with ρchg =
ρnew = 0.05. Top: Cumulative frequency for the number of incoming links
(clients) and total incoming weight (sum over all clients weights). Bottom:
Cumulative frequency for total sales and profits histogram. In all graphs black
solid lines are averages over 20 realizations. Dashed black lines are a guide
for the eye and correspond to f(x) ∼ x−1.1. Other parameters are: σ = 0.5,
τp = τw = 0.8 and M = 10000.
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Figure 8: Other firms statistics after 2 106 time steps for the model with ρchg =
ρnew = 0.05 (as in Fig. 7). Frequency and cumulative frequency for firms
lifetime. For longer lifetimes the distribution has an exponential decay (see
inset) followed by a power law tail with exponent ∼ 2.5. Results are averages
over 20 realizations. Other parameters are: σ = 0.5, τp = τw = 0.8 and
M = 10000.
16
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.60
To understand the emergence of scale-free production network and distribu-
tion of firm’ size, one has to focus on the inner workings of competition. As
hinted at in section 3.1, except in degenerate cases, there is permanent entry
and exit of firms in our model. This competition shapes the structure of the
production network and the distribution of firms’ size. More precisely, the pro-
duction structure that emerges must be consistent with the speeds at which
challenger firms grow (when they are competitive) and incumbent firms shrink
(when they are no longer competitive).
In particular, fat-tails in the degree distribution of the production network
emerges in our setting because of two basic facts about the “economy” of suppli-
ers’ switches. On the one hand, the number of incoming business opportunities
for a firm is independent of its size. On the other hand, the rate at which exist-
ing consumers may quit grows linearly with the size of the firm. Therefore, at
(a statistical) equilibrium, the degree/size distribution must be Zipf in order to
balance the flow of incoming and outgoing links. The remaining of this section
provides a formal proof of this argument.
The natural approach to characterize the asymptotic properties of the degree
distribution is to analyze the master equation4 that specifies the evolution of the
probability P (k, t) to have a firm of degree k in the network at time t. Assuming
that the time interval is chosen small enough so that there is a single link swap
per period, this master equation is of the form:
P (k, t+1) = P (k−1, t)ρk−1(t)+P (k+1, t)µk+1(t)−P (k, t)(ρk(t)+µk(t)) (17)
where ρk(t) and µk(t) denote respectively the probability that a firm of degree
k gains and loses a link at time t. Figure 9 represents the asymptotic behavior
of a solution to this master-equation (with transition probabilities computed
as described below). This behavior is perfectly in line with the one observed
in the model: a power-law emerges with exponent close to 2. These simulation
results have strong analytical counterparts. Namely, we obtain the following
characterization of stationary distributions.
Proposition 1 There exists a stationary solution (P k)k∈N of Equation (17)
such that, as k → +∞ :
F k :=
k∑
`=1
P ` ∼ 1− d
k
(18)
where d is the (fixed) mean degree in the network.
Proof: According to equation 11, the probability for a firm to gain or lose a
link depends only on its position in the price ordering. More precisely, let us
denote by ij(t) the id of the jth most expensive firm at time t. One then denotes
4The master equation approach is seldom used in economics but is standard in the natural
sciences, in particular in statistical physics [see e.g Van Kampen, 1992].
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Figure 9: Numerical results for the stationary cumulative distribution of Eq. 17
with n = 2000 (red line). The exponent of the dashed black line is 0.989.
by pi+j (t) and pi
−
j (t) respectively the probability that firm ij(t) receives a new
incoming link and loses an incoming link. One has:
pi+j (t) =
1
n
n− j
n− 1 (19)
pi−j (t) =
dj(t)
nd
j − 1
n− 1 (20)
where dj(t) denotes the (in)degree of firm j(t) an nd is the total number of links.
One then has:
ρk(t) =
1
n(n− 1)
∑
{j|dj(t)=k}
n− j (21)
µk(t) =
k
(n− 1)nd
∑
{j|dj(t)=k}
j − 1 (22)
We then focus on sufficient conditions for a degree distribution to be station-
ary, i.e to satisfy the following equation for all k ∈ N:
Pk−1ρk−1 + Pk+1µk+1 − Pkρk − Pkµk = 0 (23)
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A natural approach is to focus first on the “detailed balance” condition, which
provides a simpler sufficient condition for stationarity of the distribution as:
Pkµk = Pk−1ρk−1 (24)
or equivalently:
Pk−1
Pk
=
µk
ρk−1
(25)
Now, it is clear from equations (19) and (20) that at a stationary distribution,
the position in the price ordering must decrease with the degree. Hence, if one
denotes by ηk the number of firms of degree k at the stationary state and by
νk =
∑k
i=1 ηi, it must be that the ηk firms of degree k have positions n−νk−1 to
n−νk−1−ηk + 1 = n−νk + 1 in the price ordering. It is then standard calculus
to check that: ∑
{j|dj=k−1}
n− j = 1
2
(2νk−2 + ηk−1 − 1)ηk−1 (26)
∑
{j|dj=k}
j − 1 = 1
2
(2n− 2νk−1 − ηk − 1)ηk (27)
Using equations 26 and 27 and the fact that Pk/Pk−1 = ηk/ηk−1, the sufficient
condition becomes:
k
d
(2n− 2νk−1 − ηk − 1)ηk
(2νk−2 + ηk−1 − 1)ηk−1 =
ηk−1
ηk
(28)
or equivalently
(2n− 2νk−1 − ηk − 1)
(2νk−2 + ηk−1 − 1) =
d
k
(
ηk−1
ηk
)2 (29)
which eventually yields after division by n :
(2− 2Fk−1 − Pk − 1/n)
(2Fk−2 + Pk−1 − 1/n) =
d
k
(
Pk−1
Pk
)2 (30)
where Fk =
∑k
`=1 P` is the probability of having a firm with degree less than k.
Let us then conjecture the existence of a slowly decaying solution, that is
(P k)k∈N such that:
lim
k→+∞
P k
P k−1
= 1. (31)
It is then clear that P k is negligible with respect to 1 − F k =
∑+∞
`=k+1 P ` as
k → +∞. As moreover limk→+∞ F k = 1, equation (30) yields that as k → +∞ :
1− F k ∼ d
k
(32)
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Therefrom, one can deduce that as k →∞:
Fk ∼ 1− d
2k
(33)
Taking a continuous approximation and differentiating, it is clear that P k asymp-
totically follows a power-law with exponent −2, consistently with the conjecture.
This ends the proof.
The proof of the proposition highlights the fact that the asymptotic proper-
ties of the degree distribution are independent of the elasticity of substitution
and of any other parameter of the model. Hence the result is extremely robust.
The proof also provides a deeper insight about the driving force towards the
emergence of a scale-fee production network. As anticipated at the beginning
of this section, it is the fact that firms lose links proportionally to their degree
whereas they gain link at a constant rate that generates the scale-free structure.
Two processes are at play. On the one hand the most competitive firms tend
to attract links and hence there is a tendency towards concentration on the
most competitive firms. On the other hand, large firms are the most affected
by competition from a new entrant because their chance to lose a customer is
proportional to their size. This second process can be seen as a from of inverted
preferential attachment process [see Baraba´si and Albert, 1999] where asymp-
totically large firms lose connections proportionally to their degree (whereas
in the standard preferential attachment model finite-size firms gain new links
proportionally to their degree).
4 Conclusion
The model of monopolistic competition on the markets for intermediate goods
is central both to the international trade and the endogenous growth literature
[Ethier, 1982, Romer, 1990]. In this paper, we develop a simple dynamic exten-
sion of this model in order to investigate the endogenous formation of production
networks. The model subsumes the standard general equilibrium approach and
robustly reproduces key stylized facts of firms’ demographics, which are beyond
the scope of general equilibrium theory. Firms’ growth rates are negatively
correlated with size and follow a double-exponential distribution. Firms’ size
and production network are power-law distributed. These properties emerge
because of competitive forces. The continuous inflow of new firms shifts away
the model from a steady state to a “dynamic equilibrium” in which firms get
scaled according to their resistance to competitive forces.
An originality of our approach is to consider that technology is embedded
within the production network. Further developments in this perspective that
account for more acute forms technological innovation seems to be an interesting
avenue for future research.
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